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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the problem of incentive
mechanism design for smart-phone crowd-sourcing. Each user
participating in crowd-sourcing submits a set of tasks it can
accomplish and its corresponding bid. The platform then selects
the users and their payments to maximize its utility while
ensuring truthfulness, individual rationality, profitability, and
polynomial algorithm complexity. Both the offline and the online
scenarios are considered, where in the offline case, all users
submit their profiles simultaneously, while in the online case
they do it sequentially, and the decision whether to accept or
reject each user is done instantaneously with no revocation. The
proposed algorithms for both the offline and the online case are
shown to satisfy all the four desired properties of an efficient
auction. Through extensive simulation, the performance of the
offline and the online algorithm is also compared.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowd-sourcing using smart phones is a new idea that
has gained widespread interest [1]–[8]. Smart phones these
days are equipped with multiple sensors that can be used to
monitor key features of the surrounding environment that help
in improving the user experience or simplifying human effort.
Collectively using data derived from multiple smart phones
(called crowd-sourcing) helps in improving the social welfare,
e.g. helps public utility companies to track potholes locations,
electricity failure, emergency relief operations, traffic conges-
tion etc.
Several commercial applications using smart phone crowd-
sourcing are already in place, such as Sensorly [2], Nericell
[1], Google voice recognition and Apple’s Siri also use data
from users spread across many different locations to improve
their services. In some applications, users volunteer to share
their data since that also helps in improving their own utility.
This is, however, not true in general, and necessitates an incen-
tive mechanism design, where users are externally incentivized
in the form of payments for the data/tasks they are willing to
share/perform.
In this paper, we consider the incentive mechanism design
problem for smart phone crowd-sourcing, where we model it
as a reverse auction. The platform announces a set of tasks that
it wants to accomplish, and each user submits the list of tasks
it is ready to provide and its corresponding bid. The platform
has a utility function associated with its set of tasks, and the
problem is to find the set of users and their corresponding
payments that maximizes its utility. One of the main challenges
in designing such incentive mechanism design is to ensure
truthfulness, i.e. no user should not have any incentive to
bid more than its true valuation. Since users expend some
resources to accomplish tasks, it is natural to assume that they
will seek to maximize the profit they intend to make from the
platform.
One of the ways to ensure truthful auction is the VCG
mechanism [9]. In a forward auction, the VCG mechanism
charges each individual the harm it causes to other bidders in
terms of the social welfare utility, while in a reverse auction,
it pays each user an amount equal to the value contributed
by the user to the auction [9]. However, finding the winning
set of users in a VCG mechanism is combinatorial and has
exponential complexity. There also some technical difficulties
with the VCG mechanism [10]. So for a computationally
feasible operation such as smart-phone crowd-sourcing, one
cannot directly use the VCG mechanism. Several variations
of VCG mechanism can be found in [11], [12].
There are two basic paradigms for smart-phone crowd-
sourcing, offline and online. In offline case, all users are
present/active simultaneously, and send their profiles to the
platform at the same time. In the online case, users arrive
sequentially one at a time and submit their profiles, and the
platform must decide immediately whether to accept or reject
the user and how much to pay the user. A decision once made,
is irrevocable. For example, the offline scenario is applicable
for current traffic congestion monitoring, while the online case
is more suited for potholes tracking type of applications that
are localized, where users pass over potholes in a given area
sequentially. The online scenario is more general than the
offline case, since all potentially participating users may not
be active at the same time.
For both the offline and online scenarios, the platform’s
objective is to select the set of users and their payments to
maximize its utility, subject to the following four requirements
[13], [14]: computational efficiency - the algorithm imple-
mented by the platform has polynomial run time complexity,
individual rationality - the selfish utilities of all users involved
are non-negative, profitability- the platform utility is non-
negative after the auction concludes, and truthfulness - no user
has any incentive to bid different from its true valuation.
In prior work, an incentive design mechanism called M-
Sensing satisfying all the four properties for the offline case
has been derived in [8]. M-sensing uses a greedy algorithm that
at each step adds the user with maximum incremental utility. It
pays each user in the selected set, the maximum value which
that user can bid and still be selected at some possible position
in the greedy selection phase. More recently in [15], both
offline and online algorithms for sensing time schedules have
been proposed for the crowd-sourcing problem. The proposed
algorithms are shown to be truthful, and more importantly,
2analytical performance guarantees have been found on the
performance of both offline and online algorithms in [15].
However, [15] only considers a linear utility function.
In this paper, we first propose an algorithm for the offline
case motivated from the VCG mechanism design and the
greedy approach of the M-sensing algorithm. Our algorithm
called SMART, first greedily finds a screening set that is
identical to the M-sensing winner set. Thereafter, inspired by
the VCG mechanism, the screened set is refined further to keep
only those users that have positive marginal utility, and the
payment to each user is equal to the marginal utility increase
compared to the next best user plus the bid of the next best
user. We show that SMART satisfies all the four properties
required for efficient mechanism design. In addition, we show
that the platform utility of SMART is always greater than
or equal to that of M-sensing, while with incurring identical
complexity.
Another important advantage of SMART algorithm is that it
can be adapted easily for the online case, while still satisfying
the four properties. For the online case, we take motivation
from the online k-secretary problem [16], [17]. In the online
k-secretary problem, N secretaries with arbitrary ranks arrive
in a uniformly random order and the problem is to select the k
best ranked secretaries in an online manner. The best known
algorithms for solving the online k-secretary problem reject
the first m = N/e secretaries, and generating a threshold set
from the first m secretaries, which is then used to select the k
best secretaries among the remaining N −m secretaries. For
the online smart-phone crowd-sourcing problem, we reject the
first few users and run the offline SMART algorithm on their
profiles. The output of the offline SMART algorithm is then
used to select the users from the remaining users and to decide
their payments, such that the four properties are satisfied.
Typically, the online and offline solutions are compared
through the competitive ratio [18], which is defined to be the
ratio of the utility obtained by the online algorithm to that
obtained by the offline algorithm. Ideally, we would like the
competitive ratio to be as close to unity as possible. For the
k-secretary problem, the competitive ratio has been shown to
be 1 − 1/e if m = N
e
. In the crowd-sourcing problem, as
shown in [16], [17], if you pay each selected user its own bid,
the mechanism is not truthful. This key point complicates the
computation of the competitive ratio for the crowd-sourcing
problem. Users selected in the offline and online case are
actually paid differently to ensure truthfulness. So there is
no easy analytical way to compare the utility of the offline
and the online algorithms, unlike the k-secretary problem. We
thus resort to extensive simulation to find the competitive ratio
that depends of m, the number of users rejected and used for
running the offline SMART algorithm, and find that most often
m = n/3, where n is the total number of users.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The problem of smart-phone crowd-sourcing is modeled as
a reverse auction. The platform declares a set of tasks to be
performed, of which each task has some value to the platform.
TABLE I
NOTATION USED
Notation Description
U Set of all users
S Set of screened users
T Set of winning users
i, j User i and User j in set U
n Total number of users
Γ The platform’s set of tasks
tk Task k in set Γ
m Total number of sensing tasks
χk Value of task k
χ(τ) The value of tasks in τ
vi Value of all tasks performed by user i
v(S) Value of tasks performed by users in S
vi(S) Marginal value of user i, given set S
bi Bid of user i
pi Payment made to user i
ci Cost incurred by user i
τi Set of tasks performed by user i
τ(S) Set of tasks performed by users in S
τi(S) Marginal tasks done by user i, given set S
ωi Personal or intrinsic utility of user i
ui Platform utility of user i
u(S) Platform utility of users in S
ui(S) Marginal utility of user i, given set S
γi Minimum replacement user’s bid
σi(S) Difference of marginal value and bid
The users submit their profiles to the platform, where each
profile contains a list of tasks they will complete and their
corresponding bid. The users expect to be paid an amount
at least equal to their bid if they perform their tasks. In the
offline case, the platform receives the profiles of all users
simultaneously. The platform must decide which users to select
and how much to pay each selected user. The offline problem
can therefore be described as follows. Given a set U of users,
select a set T ⊆ U , so that the platform utility1 of T is
maximized over all possible subsets of U . In the online case,
users arrive one at a time and submit their profiles to the
platform. The platform must decide immediately whether to
accept or reject the user and how much to pay the user. A
decision once made, is irrevocable. Similar to the offline case,
the objective in this case too is to maximize the platform utility
of a set T ⊆ U , however, with causal user profiles.
Let the platform declare the set of tasks Γ =
{t1, t2, t3, . . . , tm}, where the value of a task tk, is given by
χ(tk), which for the sake of brevity will be written as χk.
Further, the function χ is extended for any set of tasks τ ⊆ Γ,
χ(τ), where it could be linear χ(τ) =
∑
i:ti∈τ
χi or any other
arbitrary combinatorial function.
Let the set of users be U = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}. Each user
i ∈ U can perform a set of tasks τi ⊆ Γ for a bid bi. The
value of a user i to the platform is, vi = χ(τi).
For a set of users S ⊆ U , the set of tasks performed by
them are denoted by τ(S), with
τ(S) =
⋃
i∈S
τi, (1)
1The term platform utility is defined formally later. It relates to the profit
the platform obtains from a set of users
3and the value of S ⊆ U is,
v(S) = χ(τ(S)). (2)
Note that the function v(S) need not be linear.
Let the marginal value of a user i with respect to a set
S ⊆ U be denoted by vi(S), defined as,
vi(S) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S). (3)
The marginal value of a user i with respect to a set S is also
the value of task set τi
∖(
τi ∩ τ(S)
)
.
The platform utility of a user i is denoted by ui = vi − pi,
and is defined as the difference between the value of user i
and the payment made to user i, which measures the profit the
platform obtains by choosing user i.
Generalizing, the platform utility of a set S of users is
denoted by u(S) and is,
u(S) = v(S)−
∑
i∈S
pi. (4)
The marginal utility, ui(S), of a user i, given a set S of
users is the difference between the utility of the set S ∪ {i}
and the utility of set S,
ui(S) = u(S ∪ {i})− u(S). (5)
The marginal utility is also equal to the difference between
the marginal value of user i and the payment made to user i,
ui(S) = vi(S)− pi. (6)
The difference between the marginal value (with respect to
S ⊆ U ) and bid of a user i is denoted by σi(S),
σi(S) = vi(S\{i})− bi. (7)
The personal or selfish utility of a user i is denoted by
ωi, and measures the personal profit that user i has gained
through the reverse auction. If ci is the cost incurred by user
i in completing tasks for the platform and pi is the payment
made to user i by the platform, the personal utility of user i
is
ωi = pi − ci, (8)
if user i is selected by the platform and zero otherwise.
The problem of smart-phone crowd-sourcing is now for-
mally defined.
Problem 1: Given a set U of users,
max
T⊆U
u(T ), (9)
subject to the four properties of an efficient auction, namely,
computational efficiency, individual rationality, profitability
and truthfulness.
The four properties of an efficient auction are described
below.
• Computational efficiency - An auction is computationally
efficient if the algorithm used to find winning users has
polynomial run time complexity.
• Individual rationality - An auction is individual rational
if the selfish utilities of all users involved are non-
negative.
• Profitability - An auction is profitable if the platform
utility is non-negative after the auction concludes.
• Truthfulness - An auction is called truthful, if and only
if a user involved in the auction has no incentive to bid
different from its true value.
The first three properties ensure that the proposed algo-
rithms are feasible. Truthfulness makes the reverse auction
free from market manipulation. It establishes that there is no
incentive for users to manipulate their bids in the hope of
higher individual profits.
III. OFFLINE CASE
A. Design of the Mechanism
To solve the offline smart-phone crowd-sourcing problem,
we propose an algorithm called SMART, that stands for
Search for Marginal Appropriate Replacement Tasks users.
The algorithm consists of three phases, the screening phase
followed by the winner selection phase and finally the bad
user removal phase. In the winner selection phase, the payment
made to each winning user is also determined.
The algorithm follows the greedy approach while selecting
users in the screening phase. It maintains a screening set S
(initially set to ∅), to keep track of screened users in this
phase. It iterates through U\S and picks the user i, having
the maximum difference in marginal value and bid vi(S)− bi,
with respect to current set S. This user is added to S and
the process repeats as long as there are users with a positive
difference in marginal value and bid with respect to S.
After the screening phase, the winner selection phase be-
gins, where the output of the screening phase S is provided as
an input. Initially, the set of winning users T is set as S, and
the algorithm iterates through T in the order in which users
entered S in the screening phase.
If the difference between the marginal value (in T )
vi(T \{i}) and bid bi of any user i, given by σi(T ), is positive,
the algorithm does the following. It finds a user j /∈ T such
that j = argmaxk∈U\T vk(T \{i})− bk. If the difference of
the marginal value obtained by replacing user i with user j
and the bid of user j is positive, i.e., vj(T \{i})−bj∗ > 0 then
γi is set as vi(T \{i})−vj(T \{i})+bj. Otherwise γi is set as
infinity (an arbitrarily high value) and j is set as −1. User j is
a potential replacement for user i, and γi is the critical value
of the bid of user i beyond which it is profitable to replace
user i with user j.
For the critical value γi 6=∞, if user i’s bid bi is higher than
γi, then user j replaces user i in T . First the set T is updated
as T ∪ {j}\{i}, and then the algorithm finds a user j∗ /∈ T
to determine the payment to be made to user j, where j∗ =
argmaxk∈U\T vk(T \{j})−bk. If for user j∗, vj∗(T \{j∗})−
bj∗ > 0, then the critical value for user j, γj = vj(T \{j})−
vj∗(T \{j}) + bj∗ . Otherwise γj = ∞ and j = −1. User j is
paid an amount equal to min(γj , vj(T \j)).
4SMART Algorithm
1 // Phase 1 - User Screening
2 S ← ∅, P ← {p1, p2, p3, . . . , pn}
3 i← argmaxj∈U (vj(S)− bj)
4 while vi(S) > bi and S 6= U do
5 S ← S ∪ {i}
6 i← argmaxj∈U (vj (S)− bj)
7 endwhile
8 for each i ∈ U do
9 pi ← 0
10 endfor
11 // Phase 2 - Winner Selection
12 T ← S
13 for i = 1, 2, . . . , |T | do
14 (j, γi, βj)← Next Best User (i, U, T )
15 σi(T )← vi(T\{i}) − bi
16 βi ← User Entry Payment(U, i)
17 // Cond 1 - Positive marginal utility
18 if σi(T ) > 0 then
19 // Cond 1.1 - Pay next best user’s bid
20 if γi − bi ≥ 0 and γi ≤ βi and γi 6=∞
21 pi ← γi
22 // Cond 1.2 - Replace with next best user
23 else if γi < bi and γi ≤ βi and γi 6=∞
24 (T, pj)← Replace User (U, T, i, j)
25 // Cond 1.3 - Pay marginal value in S
26 else if γi > βi or γi =∞
27 pi ← min(σi(T ) + bi, βi)
28 endif
29 // Cond 2 - Non-Positive Marginal Value
30 else if σi(T ) ≤ 0 and γi 6=∞
31 (T, pj)← Replace User (U, T, i, j)
32 else if σi(T ) ≤ 0 and γi =∞
33 T ← T\{i}
34 endif
35 endfor
36 // Phase 3 - Bad User Removal
37 for each i in T do
38 if ui(T\{i}) ≤ 0 then
39 T ← T\{i}
40 pi ← 0
41 endif
42 endfor
43 Return (T, P )
Next Best User (i, U, T )
1 j ← argmaxk∈U\T vk(T\{i}) − bk , βj ←∞
2 if vj(T\{i}) − bj > 0 then
3 γi ← vi(T\{i}) − vj(T\{i}) + bj
4 else
5 j ← −1, γi ←∞
6 endif
7 Return (j, γi, βi)
Replace User (U, T, i, j)
1 T ← (T\{i}) ∪ {j}
2 (k, γj , βk)← Next Best User (j, U, T )
3 if γj < vj(T\{j}) then
4 pj = γj
5 else if γj ≥ vj(T\{j})
6 pj = vj(T\{j})
7 endif
8 Return (T, pj)
User Entry Payment (U, i)
1 Si ← ∅, βi ← 0, j ← argmaxk∈U\{i}(vk(S) − bk)
2 while vi(Si) > bi and Si 6= U\{i} do
3 βi ← max(βi, vi(Si)− vj(Si) + bj)
4 Si ← Si ∪ {j};
5 j ← argmaxk∈U\{i}(vk(S)− bk)
6 endwhile
7 Return βi
If γi = ∞ and j = −1, then there are no users in U\T
that can replace user i and increase platform utility. Therefore,
user i is retained in T and the algorithm does the following to
determine user i’s payment. It finds the maximum amount that
user i could bid and still enter the screening set S and stores it
as βi. It pays user i, pi = min{βi, vi(T )}, the minimum of βi
and the marginal value of user i in T . Note that by definition
βj is set as infinity for any user j /∈ S that was not selected
in the screening phase of the algorithm.
If σi(T ) is non-positive, then the algorithm finds the
user j ∈ U\S that has maximum σj((T \{i}) ∪ {j}). If
σj((T \{i})∪{j}) is positive, then user j replaces user i in T ,
and the payment for user j is determined as described above.
Otherwise user i is removed from T and its payment is set to
zero.
Finally, after iterating through all elements of T , the bad
user removal phase occurs. Any user i in T having non-
positive marginal utility with respect to T is removed from T .
This ensures that only users having positive marginal utility
are retained.
B. Walk Through Example
We use the model situation presented in Fig. 1 as an example
to explain the functioning of the SMART algorithm.
1 2 3 4 5
6 28 6 7
9 8 6 8 10 9
1 2 3 4 5 6
Fig. 1. Walk Through Example
In Fig. 1, the squares with numbers in them represent users
and the circles represent tasks. The value mentioned above
a square corresponds to the bid of the user depicted by the
square. The value mentioned below the circle corresponds to
the value of the task represented by that circle. The working
of the algorithm is illustrated as follows
• User Screening:
1) S = ∅ : v1(∅)− b1 = 25, v2(∅)− b2 = 18, v3(∅)−
b3 = 17, v4(∅) − b4 = 2, v5(∅) − b5 = 7. Hence,
S ← S ∪ {1}.
2) S = {1} : v2({1}) − b2 = v({1, 2}) − v({1}) −
b2 = 2, similarly, v3({1})− b3 = 3, v4({1})− b4 =
2, v5({1})− b5 = −2. Hence, S ← S ∪ {3}.
3) S = {1, 3} : v2({1, 3})− b2 = 2, v4({1, 3})− b4 =
−7, v5({1, 3})− b5 = −2. Hence, S ← S ∪ {2}.
4) S = {1, 3, 2} : v4({1, 3, 2}) − b4 =
−7, v5({1, 3, 2}) − b5 = −2. At this point the
screening phase ends and S = {1, 3, 2}.
• Winner Selection and Payment: Initially the set of win-
ning users T is set as S, that is T = {1, 3, 2}. The
5algorithm iterates through T with the index i to determine
winners and their payments.
1) T (1) = {1}, hence i = 1. Now, v1(T \{1}) =
v1(T ) − v1(T \{1}) = 9. The Next Best User
selection phase proceeds as follows. U\T = {4, 5}
and T \{1} = {2, 3}. v4({3, 2})− b4 = 0− 7 = −7
and v5({3, 2}) − b5 = 9 − 2 = 7. As j =
argmaxk∈U\T vk({3, 2}) − bk and v5({3, 2}) −
b5 = 9 − 2 = 7 > 0, j = 5 and β5 = ∞.
γ1 = v1({3, 2}) − v5({3, 2}) + b5 = 9 − 9 +
2 = 2. The User Entry Payment function exe-
cutes as follows. S1 = ∅. In the first iteration
v2(∅) − b2 = 18 is the maxk∈U\{1} vk(S1) − bk,
hence, S1 = {2}. Now, v1(∅) − v2(∅) + b2 =
33−24+6 = 15. Therefore, β1 = max(0, 15) = 15.
In the second iteration v3({2}) − b3 = 11 is the
maxk∈U\{1,2} vk(S1) − bk, hence, S1 = {2, 3}.
v1({2}) − v3({2}) + b3 = 6, therefore, β1 =
max(15, 6) = 15. In the third iteration v5({2, 3})−
b5 = 7 is the maxk∈U\{1,2,3} vk(S1) − bk, hence,
S1 = {2, 3, 5} and β1 = max(15, 2) = 15. The
iterations of the User Entry Payment function end
as v4({2, 3, 5})− b4 < 0 and β1 = 15 is returned.
Now, σ1 = 9−8 = 1 > 0, hence, Cond 1 is chosen.
As γ1 = 2 < b1 = 8 and γ1 = 2 < β1 = 15, Cond
1.2 is chosen. The Replace User function in this
case runs as follows. T = {5, 3, 2} and the Next
Best User function yields k = 1, γ5 = 8. Since
γ5 = 8 6=∞, p5 = γ5 = 8.
2) S(2) = {3}, hence i = 3. Similar to iteration 1,
the Next Best User selection phase yields, j = 4,
β4 = ∞ and γ3 = 15. The User Entry Payment
function yields β3 = 7. Since, σ3(T ) = 17 − 6 =
11 > 0, Cond 1 is executed. As γ3 = 15 > b3 = 6
and γ3 = 15 > β3 = 7, Cond 1.3 is followed.
The payment made is p3 = min(β3, v3(T \{3})) =
min(7, 17) = 7.
3) S(3) = {2}, hence i = 2. The Next Best User
function yields j = 1, γ2 = 16 and β1 is re-set to
∞. The User Entry Payment function yields β2 = 8.
The σ2 for this user is v2(T \{2}) − b2 = 18 −
6 = 12 > 0. Hence, Cond 1 is followed. As γ2 =
16 > b2 = 6 and γ2 = 16 > β2 = 8, Cond 1.3 is
followed. The payment made is p2 = 8.
• Bad User Removal: v2({3, 5})− p2 = 18− 8 = 10 > 0.
v3({2, 5})− p3 = 17 − 7 = 10 > 0. v5({2, 3})− p5 =
9− 8 = 1 > 0. Therefore no user is removed from T .
• Result of the Algorithm: The final set of winning users,
T = {2, 3, 5} and the payment made to these users is
p2 = 8, p3 = 7 and p5 = 8. Therefore, the value of
the tasks performed by the users is v(T ) = 50 and the
payment made to these users is
∑
i∈T pi = 23. Hence
the platform utility in this case is
u(T ) = v(T )−
∑
i∈T
pi,
u(T ) = 27.
• For this example, M-Sensing [8] produces a platform
utility of 20. The set of screened users S of SMART
are the set of winning users of M-Sensing {1, 3, 2}. M-
Sensing pays each winning user i an amount equal to
βi calculated from the User Entry Payment function,
therefore, p1 = β1 = 15, p2 = β2 = 8, p3 = β3 = 8.
The next section shows that SMART satisfies the four
properties of an efficient auction.
C. Properties of the Algorithm
Lemma 1: SMART is computationally efficient.
Proof: User Screening phase takes O(nm2) time: The
screening phase selects at most m users since we have at most
m tasks, and each step to select the best user with largest
marginal utility takes O(nm) time.
Winner Selection phase takes O(nm3) time: Again, since
initially the size of set |T | = |S| ≤ m, the main routine in the
Winner Selection phase that runs through the elements of T
takes at most O(m) time. There are four sub-routines in the
Winner Selection phase: Next Best User Function, Replace
User Function, User Entry Payment and Bad User Removal.
The Next Best User function takes at most O(n) time since
it finds the possible replacement among the n users. Since
Replace User function invokes the Next Best User function,
it also takes at most O(n) time. The User Entry Payment
function is similar to the User screening routine and takes
O(nm2) time. The Bad User Removal phase also sequentially
runs for |T | ≤ m time, hence it takes O(m) time. Hence,
the computational complexity of the SMART algorithm is
at most O(nm3), hence polynomial. Therefore, SMART is
computationally efficient.
Lemma 2: SMART is individually rational.
Proof: Since user i bids bi and user i is assumed to be
rational, bi− ci > 0. Therefore, to prove individual rationality
of the SMART algorithm, we only need to prove that ∀ i ∈
T , pi ≥ bi, where T is the final set of winning users. In
the SMART Algorithm, the payment made to winning users
depends on either Cond 1.1, or Cond 1.2, or Cond 1.3, or
Cond 2. We discuss each case individually.
• Cond 1.1. User i is paid according to Cond 1.1 if and
only if γi ≥ bi, where γi is the critical bid value above
which it is profitable to replace user i with another user
from U\T . Since user i is paid pi = γi, hence, pi ≥ bi.
• Cond 1.2. In this case γi < bi and γi 6= ∞, i.e. there
exits an user j ∈ U\T that will replace user i ∈ T , where
user j is such that j = argmaxk∈U\T vk(T \{j})− bk,
computed at Line 14 of the SMART (by running the Next
Best User function). This is the most involved cases to
prove, where we have to show that the payment made to
a replacement user j is more than or equal to its bid.
Let T before the replacement be Told, and after the
replacement be Tnew = T ∪ {j}\{i}. Note that, since
6γi 6= ∞ that is computed at Line 14 of the SMART (by
running the Next Best User function), it implies that
vj(Told\{i})− bj > 0, (10)
from Line 2 of the Next Best User function.
To find the payment for the replacement user j, pj , at Line
24 of SMART, first the Replace User function is called
with input {Told, i, j}, that in turn calls the Next Best
User function with input {Told, j}. The Next Best User
function finds user j∗ = argmaxk∈U\Tnew vk(Tnew\{j})−
bk. Since Tnew = T ∪ {j}\{i}, j∗ ∈ U\Told or j∗ = i.
– In the Next Best User Function if vj∗(Tnew\{j})−
bj∗ > 0, then the critical value for user j is
γj = vj(Tnew\{j}) − vj∗(Tnew\{j}) + bj∗ . Then
returning to the Replace User function to find pj ,
if γj ≤ vj(Tnew\{j}), then pj = γj , otherwise
pj = vj(Tnew\{j}). Note that from (10), we know
that vj(Tnew\{j}) ≥ bj . Since Tnew\{j} = Told\{i}
we only need to prove that whenever pj = γj ,
γj ≥ bj .
If j∗ ∈ U\Told, then since user j was the best
replacement for user i among users in Told\{i} =
Tnew\{j} computed at line 14 of SMART, we have
that vj(Tnew\{j})− vj∗(Tnew\{j}) + bj∗ − bj ≥ 0.
Thus, γj ≥ bj .
Otherwise, if j∗ = i, then from Line 3 of the
Next Best User function, γj = vj(Tnew\{j}) −
vi(Tnew\{j}) + bi, which is also equivalent to γj =
vj(Told\{i})−vi(Told\{i})+bi. Since with Cond 1.2,
γi < bi, where γi = vi(Told\{i})−vj(Told\{i})+bj.
vi(Told\{i})−vj(Told\{i})+ bj− bi < 0. Therefore,
γj > bj .
– If vj∗(Tnew\{j})− bj∗ ≤ 0, then γj = ∞ and pj =
vj(Tnew\{j}). The claim follows from (10), where it
is shown that vj(Tnew\{j}) ≥ bj .
• Cond 1.3. Here, pi = min(σi(T ) + bi, βi). Let pi =
σi(T )+ bi. As σi(T ) = vi(T \{i})− bi, pi = vi(T \{i}).
Since Cond 1.3 is a Sub-Condition of Cond 1, which
requires that vi(T \{i}) > bi, pi > bi. Let pi = βi. Note
that βi represents the maximum bid that user i could have
bid and still enter S. Since, user i was selected, bi < βi
which implies bi < pi.
• Cond 2. The situation becomes equivalent to Cond 1.2.
As the payment made according to Cond 1.2 has been
proved to be individually rational, so is the payment made
according to Cond 2.
We next show that the proposed SMART algorithm is
profitable.
Lemma 3: SMART is profitable.
Proof: To prove this Lemma, we take an indirect route by
showing that the utility of SMART is at least as much as M-
Sensing (Lemma 4), and the result follows since M-Sensing
[8] is profitable.
This gives us one short proof for showing two results, that
SMART is profitable and is at least as profitable as M-Sensing.
Lemma 4: The utility of SMART is greater than or equal
to the utility of M-Sensing [8].
Proof: The output set S of the screening phase of SMART
is equal to the final selection set of M-Sensing. SMART then
refines S further through the Winner Selection phase and
the Bad User removal phase. In the winner selection phase,
SMART initially sets the set of winning users T to be equal
to S and then iteratively updates T . Moreover, note that with
M-Sensing, and SMART, the payment for each user i ∈ S,
is βi, and pi = min{γi, σi(T ) + bi, viβi}, respectively. Thus,
pi ≤ βi.
So initially,
v(S)−
∑
l∈S
βl = v(T )−
∑
l∈T
βl, (11)
since T = S.
In each iteration of the winner selection phase of SMART
the current user, say user i is either retained, removed or
replaced.
• If the current user i is retained there is no change in T ,
and still T = S, however, since pi ≤ βi,
v(S)−
∑
l∈S
βl ≤ v(T )− pi −
∑
l∈S\{i}
βl. (12)
• The current user i is removed if and only if σi(T )− bi ≤
0. Therefore, vi(T \{i})− bi ≤ 0, which implies v(T )−
v(T \{i})− bi ≤ 0, and finally, v(T \{i}) ≥ v(T )− bi.
Since M-Sensing is rational, βi ≥ bi, we have
v(T \{i}) ≥ v(T )− βi.
Therefore, after removing user i, with T ← T \{i},
v(S)−
∑
l∈S
βl ≤ v(T )−
∑
l∈T
βl. (13)
• The replacement of the current user i can occur at two
points in the SMART algorithm, in Cond 1.2 at lines
23, 24 and in Cond 2 at lines 30, 31. In both cases,
the Replace User function is called to replace user i
with another user say user j ∈ U\T . Let the set of
winning users be Told before replacement and Tnew after
replacement. Tnew = (Told\{i}) ∪ {j}.
– Consider the replacement done in lines 23 and 24.
In this situation γi ≤ bi, γi ≤ βi and γi 6= ∞. The
Replace User function first performs replacement
and then calls the Next Best User function with
inputs as {j, U, Tnew}. The Next Best User function
finds k = argmaxm∈U\Tnew vm(Tnew\{j})− bm and
returns γj = vj(Tnew\{j}) − vk(Tnew\{j}) + bk.
Since i ∈ U\Tnew, therefore, vk(Tnew\{j}) − bk ≥
vi(Tnew\{j}) − bi. This implies that in the worst
case, the replacement user k is same as user i.
Therefore, in the worst case γj = vj(Tnew\{j}) −
vi(Tnew\{j})+bi. Since the payment made in the Re-
place User function is pj = min(γj , vj(Tnew\{j})),
pj ≤ γj . Therefore,
pj ≤ vj(Tnew\{j}) − vi(Tnew\{j}) + bi, which on
rearranging, vi(Tnew\{j}) − bi ≤ vj(Tnew\{j}) −
7pj . Since Tnew\{j} = Told\{i}, it follows that
vi(Told\{i})− bi ≤ vj(Tnew\{j})− pj .
As M-Sensing is individually rational, βi ≥ bi,
therefore, vi(Told\{i})− βi ≤ vj(Tnew\{j})− pj .
– Consider the replacement done in lines 30 and 31.
In this situation σi(Told) ≤ 0 and γi 6= ∞. Since,
γi 6= ∞, vj(Told\{i})− bj ≥ 0. Since, σi(Told) ≤ 0,
vi(Told\{i})− bi ≤ 0. As M-Sensing is individually
rational, βi ≥ bi therefore, vi(Told\{i})− βi ≤ 0.
Also, since the payment made in the replace
user function pj = min(γj , vj(Tnew\{j})), pj ≤
vj(Tnew\{j}). Hence, vj(Tnew\{j})− pj ≥ 0.
Therefore, vi(Told\{i})− βi ≤ vj(Tnew\{j})− pj .
Consider the first iteration of SMART in the win-
ner selection phase for replacement. Here, S = Told
and Tnew\{j} = S\{i}. Therefore, vi(S\{i}) − βi ≤
vj(Tnew\{j}) − pj , which implies v(S) − v(S\{i}) −
βi ≤ v(Tnew) − v(Tnew\{j})− pj . Since v(Tnew\{j}) =
v(S\{i}), v(S) − βi ≤ v(Tnew) − pj . Subtracting∑
l∈S\{i} βl to both sides, we get
v(S)−
∑
l∈S
βl ≤ v(Tnew)− pj −
∑
l∈S\{i}
βl. (14)
Now consider the situation when nth replacement occurs.
Let the set of winning users before replacement be Toldn
and let the set of winning users after replacement be
Tnewn . Therefore,
Toldn = (S\{i1, . . . , in−1}) ∪ {j1, . . . , jn−1}), (15)
Tnewn = (S\{i1, . . . , in}) ∪ {j1, . . . , jn}). (16)
Generalizing (14) at the nth iteration, we get, v(S) −∑
l∈S βl
≤ v(Tnewn)−
∑
m∈{j1,...,jn}
pj −
∑
l∈S\{i1,...,in}
βl. (17)
Let (17) hold true. Lets analyze the n + 1th iteration.
Using the same notation,
Toldn+1 = (S\{i1, . . . , in}) ∪ {j1, . . . , jn}), (18)
Tnewn+1 = (S\{i1, . . . , in+1}) ∪ {j1, . . . , jn+1}). (19)
At the n+ 1th replacement,
vin+1(Toldn+1\{in+1})−βi ≤ vjn+1(Tnewn+1\{jn+1})−pj.
Therefore, v(Toldn+1) − v(Toldn+1\{in+1}) − βi ≤
v(Tnewn+1) − v(Tnewn+1\{jn+1}) − pj . Since,
Toldn+1\{in+1} = Tnewn+1\{jn+1},
v(Toldn+1)− βi ≤ v(Tnewn+1)− pj.
From (16) and (18), we note that Toldn+1 = Tnewn . Sub-
stituting for Tnewn from (17), we get, v(S)−
∑
l∈S βl −
βin+1 ≤ v(Tnewn+1) − pjn+1 −
∑
m∈{j1,...,jn}
pj −∑
l∈S\{i1,...,in}
βl. Hence, v(S)−
∑
l∈S βl
≤ v(Tnewn+1)−
∑
m∈{j1,...,jn+1}
pj −
∑
l∈S\{i1,...,in+1}
βl.
(20)
Therefore, from (14), (17), and (20), using induction we
get that, v(S)−
∑
l∈S βl
≤ v(Tnewn)−
∑
m∈{j1,...,jn}
pj −
∑
l∈S\{i1,...,in}
βl, (21)
is true for any arbitrary n.
In the winner selection phase, SMART iterates through all
the elements of S in a sequential manner. Using (12), (13), and,
(21), we can conclude that at the end of the winner selection
phase,
v(S)−
∑
l∈S
βl ≤ v(T )−
∑
l∈T
pl, (22)
where the LHS represents the utility of M-Sensing and the
RHS represents the utility of SMART, since the Bad User
Removal function does not decrease the utility.
Remark 3.1: In terms of profitability, M-Sensing performs
the same as SMART, when SMART retains all the users
obtained in the Screening phase and pays each user i an
amount βi. This happens when all of the following conditions
are satisfied for each user i ∈ S, where S is the set of screened
users obtained after the screening phase of SMART.
• vi(S\{i}) > 0.
• The value of γi as computed by the Next Best User
function at line 14 of SMART, is ∞ in which case no
valid replacement user exists or when γi > βi.
• βi < vi(S\{i}).
In all other scenarios, SMART has larger utility than M-
Sensing.
Next, we show the most important property of SMART,
its truthfulness. Towards that end we will use the Myerson’s
Theorem [19].
Theorem 1: [19] A reverse auction is considered truthful
if and only if
• The selection rule is monotone. If a user i wins the
auction by bidding bi, it would also win the auction by
bidding an amount b′i, where b′i < bi.
• Each winner is paid a critical amount. If a winning user
submits a bid greater than this critical value, it will not
get selected.
Lemma 5: SMART is truthful.
Proof: Monotonicity of SMART: Consider a user i that is
selected by SMART with bid bi, i.e., i ∈ T . Let user i change
its bid to b′i, where b′i < bi. Let σ′i(T ) = vi(T \{i})− b′i. Now
we look at two cases where the user i with bid bi could have
entered T .
8a) Assume that user i ∈ S, in the user screening phase, with
bid bi, and was then retained in T . By the definition of the User
Screening phase, if i ∈ S, then i = argmaxk∈U\S vk(S)− bk
at some iteration ri, where user i entered S. If user i instead
bid b′i < bi, then again user i enters S at iteration ri or earlier.
Since user i is retained in T with bid bi, by definition of
SMART, we have σi(T ) > 0 and γi > bi. Consequently,
σ′i(T ) > 0 and γi > b′i. Thus, even if user i bid b′i, both Cond.
1 and Cond. 1.1 in the Winner Selection phase are satisfied,
and therefore user i is retained in T .
b) If user i entered into T by replacing some user j ∈ T ,
then user i has to satisfy i = argmaxk∈U\T vk(T \{j})− bk
in the Next Best User function when called from Line 14 of
the SMART. Therefore, should user i decrease its bid to b′i it
would still replace user j ∈ T and enter T .
Existence of a Critical Bid Amount with SMART: We claim
that the payment pi made by SMART is critical, i.e., if any
user i bids in excess of its critical amount pi, then SMART
will not select it. Two possible conditions exist with SMART,
• A winning user i ∈ S, i ∈ T receives pi =
min(vi(T \{i}), βi, γi), where S is the set of screened
users. Lets assume that pi = vi(T \{i}), and if user i
changes its bid to b′i, b′i > vi(T \{i}), then σ′i(T ) =
vi(T \{i}) − b′i < 0. From Cond 2 of SMART, we
conclude that user i would be replaced by another user
j if possible in T or removed from T . If pi = βi and
b′i > βi, then by the definition of the User Entry Payment
function, user i will not enter the screening set S in the
User Screening phase. Therefore, user i will not enter T .
Finally, if pi = γi and b′i > γi, then from Cond 1.2 user
i will be replaced by some user j in U\T .
• A winning user i ∈ T and i /∈ S receives pi =
min(vi(T \{i}), γi). Such a user does not belong to T
at the beginning of the Winner Selection Phase and
is a replacement user. Note that, replacement users are
paid inside the Replace User Function. In the function a
replacement user say j /∈ S replaces a user i ∈ T . Let T
before the replacement be Told, and after the replacement
be Tnew = T ∪ {j}\{i}. The Replace User function calls
the Next Best User function to compute γj for user j.
This function returns both the second best user to user j,
user k and the value of γj .
Lets assume that user j is paid an amount equal to γj .
From the Next Best User Function γj = vj(Tnew\{j})−
vk(Tnew\{j})+bk. If user j bids an amount b′j > γj , then
the following happens. Since Tnew\{j} = Told\{i} from
line 1 of the Next Best User function we can conclude
that user k would take user j’s place as a replacement
user at line 14 of SMART.
Consider the alternate case when user j is paid an amount
equal to vj(Tnew\{j}). Note that user j was selected as
a replacement for user i, through the Next Best User
function call made in line 14 of SMART for the com-
putation of γi for user i. At this point the set of winning
users is Told. If user j bids b′j > vj(Tnew\{j}), then since
Tnew\{j} = Told\{i}, vj(Told\{i}) = vj(Tnew\{j}), then
from line 2 of the Next Best User function called at
line 14 of SMART, since b′j > vj(Tnew\{j}), the Next
Best User function either returns some other user k as a
replacement for user i or if the user j is the maximizer
in line 1 of the Next Best User function, then j = −1 is
returned. In conclusion, user j does not replace user i if
b′j > vj(Tnew\{j}).
D. Discussion
The SMART algorithm proposed in this section for maxi-
mizing the utility of the platform for offline crowd-sourcing
problem is a simple to implement algorithm inspired by the
VCG mechanism (that is known to be truthful but extremely
hard to compute). With SMART, we first shortlist the potential
winners using a greedy (linear time) algorithm that at each step
finds the user with the best marginal utility. Then each user in
the shortlist is kept or dropped or replaced depending on the
effective utility that user brings to the platform. The payment
strategy of SMART is similar to VCG mechanism, where each
user is paid for the marginal utility it brings to the platform,
and is equal to the increase in utility by replacing any user by
the next best user plus the bid of the next best user, unless for
some exceptional cases where it differs slightly.
In comparison to the earlier algorithm M-Sensing [8],
SMART is more selective in picking the winning users and
more frugal in payment made to each selected user. With M-
Sensing, each winning user is paid an amount equal to the
maximum amount that any user can bid and still be selected.
We show that M-Sensing pays a little too much, since SMART
is more profitable than M-Sensing while being truthful.
IV. ONLINE SCENARIO
Unlike the offline scenario, where all the users arrive
together, in the online scenario the users arrive sequentially.
The challenge posed here is that the platform must respond
to each incoming user immediately and irrevocably, though it
may not have any prior knowledge of the bidding profiles of
the users coming in the future. We adapt the SMART algorithm
for the online scenario and ensure that the resulting algorithm
adheres to the four properties of an efficient mechanism. In
order to facilitate the analysis of the problem, we make the
following assumptions in the online scenario.
• Without loss of generality, we assume that the every user
in U , is such that the total value of tasks it provides is
greater than its bid i.e., vi > bi.2
• The user does not know its time of arrival with reference
to the time of arrival of the other users.
We define U [p : q] as the set representing the successive users
from time p to q.
2If an incoming user has vi < bi, then it is rejected immediately and does
not count as a user in U .
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1 // Initialization
2 T ← ∅, R← ∅
3 P ↔ {p1, p2, . . . pn}
4 n = |U |, k = ⌊n/c⌋
5 // Phase 1 - Observation
6 R← SMART(U [1 : k]) //R is the set of winning users of SMART
7 p1, p2, . . . pn ← 0
8 // Phase 2 - Winner Selection
9 for each i = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n and |T | ≤ m do
10 if |R| < m then
11 if vi(R) − bi > 0 then
12 (R, T, P )← Add User (R, i)
13 else
14 (R, T, P )← Try To Replace (R, i)
15 end if
16 else if |R| = m
17 (R, T, P )← Try To Replace (R, i)
18 end if
19 R← Remove Bad Users (R, T )
20 endfor
21 Return (T, P )
Add User (R, i)
1 pi ← vi(R)
2 R← R ∪ {i}, T ← T ∪ {i}
3 Return (R, T, P )
A. ONLINE-SMART Algorithm
The ONLINE-SMART algorithm, motivated by the k-
secretary problem, consists of two phases, the observation
phase and the winner selection phase. In the observation
phase, it rejects the first k = ⌊n
c
⌋ (c is a constant chosen
by the platform) users on their arrival. It then runs SMART
on the bidding profiles of U [1 : k] and stores the output set
of winning users as a reference set R. Since the number of
tasks is m, the cardinality of R is less than or equal to m.
The algorithm uses this set R as a reference for selection of
users among the remaining n− k users, U [n− k : n]. In the
beginning of the selection phase, the final winners set T is set
to ∅ and users are processed as they arrive.
On the arrival of a user i ∈ U [k + 1 : n], if the cardinality
of R is less than m then the algorithm does the following. If
vi(R)−bi > 0, that is the difference in marginal value and bid
with respect to R is positive, then the algorithm adds user i to
both R and T and makes a payment pi = vi(R). If vi(R) −
bi ≤ 0 then the algorithm calls the Try To Replace function.
Try To Replace (R, i)
1 j = argmaxk∈R\T
(
v(R\{k}) ∪ {i}) − v(R) + bk − bi
)
2 if v((R\{j}) ∪ {i})− v(R) + bj > bi then
3 pi ← v((R\{j}) ∪ {i}) − v(R) + bj
4 R← (R\{j}) ∪ {i} and T ← T ∪ {i}
5 end if
6 Return (R, T, P )
Remove Bad Reference Users (R, T )
1 for each j ∈ R\T do
2 if v(R) < v(R\{j}) + bj then
3 R← R\{j}
4 end if
5 endfor
6 Return R
The Try To Replace function determines if it is profitable to
replace a user j ∈ R with user i (if v((R\{j})∪{i})−v(R)+
bj > bi). If so the algorithm replaces user j with user i. It
makes a payment to user i, pi = vi((R\{j})∪{i})−v(R)+bj.
If no user j ∈ R can be replaced profitably, user i is rejected
and the algorithm moves on to the next user.
If the cardinality of R is equal to m then there can be no
further addition of users to R without decreasing the marginal
utility of R. This is because the presence of m users implies
the completion of at least m tasks which leaves no more new
tasks to be done. Therefore, the algorithm calls the Try To
Replace function to find if any user j ∈ R can be replaced by
the current user, whose execution has been explained before.
If no user can be replaced profitably, user i is rejected and the
algorithm moves on to the next user.
Between the arrivals of two users in the selection phase the
algorithm iterates through R\T and removes any user i having
vi(R\{i})− bi ≤ 0. This ensures that all users in R have a
positive difference in marginal value and bid, and consequently
form a ”good” reference for the incoming users. The algorithm
terminates when either all users in U have arrived or when |T |
becomes equal to m.
B. Properties of the Mechanism
Lemma 6: ONLINE-SMART is computationally efficient.
Proof: In the observation phase, the platform runs the
SMART algorithm on the set of the first k users. Therefore,
from Lemma 1 the complexity associated with observation
phase is O(nm3) (since k = n
c
). In the selection phase, the
main routine runs n− k times. Within the main routine there
are two functions, one each for the Try To Replace and the
Remove Bad Reference Users. Both of these functions have a
complexity of O(m2). Consequently, the selection phase takes
O(nm2) time. Therefore the computational complexity asso-
ciated with ONLINE-SMART is O(nm3). Hence, ONLINE-
SMART is computationally efficient.
Lemma 7: ONLINE-SMART is individually rational.
Proof: To prove that ONLINE-SMART is individually
rational, it is sufficient to prove that ∀i∈T pi ≥ bi. In the
selection phase of ONLINE-SMART, a user enters the final
winner’s set T through either the Add User function or the
Try To Replace function. The Add User function is called
when the incoming user i has vi(R) > bi. Since the Add User
function pays user i, pi = vi(R), pi > bi. An incoming user i
replaces an existing user j ∈ R\T through the Try To Replace
function if and only if v((R\{j})∪{i})−v(R)+ bj− bi > 0.
Since the payment made in the Try To Replace function to
such a selected user i is pi = v((R\{j}) ∪ {i})− v(R) + bj ,
therefore pi > bi.
Lemma 8: ONLINE-SMART is profitable.
Proof: An incoming user i ∈ U [k + 1 : n] enters T
through either the Add User function or the Try To Replace
function.
Let user i enter T through the Add User function. At any
point in the algorithm the set of winning users (T ) is always
a subset of the reference set (R), that is T ⊆ R. This implies
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that for a user i ∈ U\R, the marginal tasks with respect to
R are always a subset of the marginal tasks with respect to
T , i.e. τi(R) ⊆ τi(T ). Therefore, χ(τi(R)) ≤ χ(τi(T )). The
payment made to user i is pi = vi(R) = χ(τi(R)). Hence,
vi(T ) − pi = χ(τi(T )) − χ(τi(R)) ≥ 0. The platform utility
of T ∪ {i} is u(T ∪ {i}) = v(T ) + vi(T )− pi −
∑
j∈T pi =
u(T )+vi(T )−pi. Therefore ui(T ) = u(T ∪{i})−u(T ) ≥ 0,
i.e. the incremental utility change is always non-negative.
Let user i enter T through the Try To Replace function. The
payment made to user i is
pi = v((R\{j}) ∪ {i})− v(R) + bj,
= v((R\{j}) ∪ {i})− v(R\{j}) + v(R\{j})− v(R) + bj,
= χ(τi(R\{j})) + v(R\{j})− v(R) + bj .
The increase in the utility of the platform is u(T ∪ {i}) −
u(T ) = ui(T ), where ui(T )
= vi(T )− pi,
= χ(τi(T ))− χ(τi(R\{j})) + v(R)− v(R\{j})− bj .
Since user j ∈ R\T , T ⊆ R\{j}. Therefore, χ(τi(T )) −
χ(τi(R\{j})) ≥ 0. Further the Remove Bad Reference Users
function ensures that for any j ∈ R, v(R)−v(R\{j})−bj ≥ 0.
Therefore ui(T ) ≥ 0.
Since at the start of the Selection phase u(T ) = 0 and the
addition of a user i to T through the Add User function or the
Replace User function yields ui(T ) ≥ 0, ONLINE-SMART is
profitable.
Lemma 9: ONLINE-SMART is truthful.
Proof: From Theorem 1, ONLINE-SMART is truthful if
its selection rule is monotone and the payment it makes is
critical. Let us assume that user i enters the final winners set
T with bid bi.
Let user i change its bid to b′i with b′i < bi. If user i entered
T through the Add User function, then vi(R)− bi > 0. Since
vi(R)−b′i > 0 user i enters T . If user i entered T through the
Try To Replace Function then for some j ∈ R\T , v((R\{j})∪
{i})− v(R) + bj − bi > 0. Further user i replaces user j in
R. Since v((R\{j}) ∪ {i})− v(R) + bj − bi > 0, user i still
replaces user j in R and enters T . Hence the selection rule of
ONLINE-SMART is monotone.
Let user i change its bid to b′i with b′i > pi. If user i entered
T through the Add User function then pi = vi(R). Since
b′i > vi(R), vi(R)− b
′
i < 0 and user i no longer enters T . If
user i entered T through the Try To Replace Function, then it
replaces some j ∈ R\T and is paid pi = v((R\{j})∪ {i})−
v(R) + bj . Since v((R\{j}) ∪ {i}) − v(R) + bj − b′i < 0,
user i no longer replaces user j in R and consequently it does
not enter T . Hence the payment made by ONLINE-SMART
is critical.
C. Discussion
ONLINE-SMART is a k-secretary algorithm equivalent of
the SMART algorithm. It works by initially rejecting a few
users, whose profiles are used by the offline SMART algorithm
to generate a reference set that is used to select/reject future
Fig. 2. Variation of Utility With Users
users and to decide their respective payments. The reference
set allows the platform to select users with positive marginal
utility. Also, since in the online scenario we assumed that each
user does not know when it arrives in relation to other users,
the payment strategy with ONLINE-SMART that ensures
truthfulness is simpler than the SMART.
In general, the ”goodness” of any online algorithm is mea-
sured by its competitive ratio, i.e. the ratio of the utility of the
online algorithm with the utility of the offline algorithm. For
the k-secretary problem, the competitive ratio has been shown
to be around 1 − 1/e, where the first 1/e users are rejected,
assuming that users arrive uniformly randomly. Finding the
competitive ratio of the ONLINE-SMART is, however, very
challenging, since one can compare the users that are selected
with ONLINE-SMART and SMART, but not their payments
since there is no direct relation between them. The latter fact
does not allow any tractable analytical solution for finding the
competitive ratio of the ONLINE-SMART, and to understand
its behavior with respect to the SMART, we turn to extensive
numerical simulations. Not surprisingly, it turns out it is
optimal to approximately reject the first 1/3 users (similar
to k-secretary problem), to get the best competitive ratio.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of SMART and
ONLINE-SMART using numerical simulations and compare
it with M-Sensing [8]. Fig. 2 plots platform utility with respect
to the number of users. For Fig. 2, the number of tasks were
kept constant while varying the number of users. We used
m = 1000 tasks with values of tasks generated uniformly
randomly between 30 and 50. Each user was assumed to bid
for 25% of the tasks randomly and each bid was generated
uniformly randomly between 5 and 50. Fig. 2 clearly shows
that SMART outperforms M-Sensing by roughly 15%.
In Fig. 3, we plot the platform utility with respect to the
number of tasks m. We keep the number of users fixed to
n = 100. Again, each user was assumed to bid for 25%
of the tasks randomly and each bid was generated uniformly
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Fig. 4. Variation of Utility With Mean Task Completion
randomly between 5 and 50. Tasks were generated with values
ranging uniformly between 0 and 20.
Once again Fig. 3 shows that SMART has larger utility com-
pared to M-Sensing, however, the margin is smaller compared
to Fig. 2. Further, it is interesting to note that the performance
of SMART improves compared to M-Sensing as number of
tasks m increases.
Fig. 4 plots the platform Utility with respect to the mean
fraction of tasks that a user completes. The number of users
and the number of tasks were kept constant, while the fraction
of total tasks that any user completes on average were varied.
We used n = 50 users and m = 100 tasks, where each user
bids uniformly randomly between 5 and 50, and each task
had values uniformly randomly between 0 and 20. From Fig.
4, we can see that SMART performs better than M-Sensing
for all values of fractions of mean task completion. Further,
SMART provides a healthy improvement in Platform Utility
over M-Sensing when each user bids to complete about 20%
to 70% of the tasks.
Next, we move on to to quantify the performance of the
ONLINE-SMART in comparison to SMART to understand
the competitive ratio. In Fig. 5, we plot the competitive ratio
of the ONLINE-SMART as a function of k. We used n = 100
users, and each user was assumed to bid for 25% of the tasks
Fig. 5. Variation of the Competitive Ratio with the Fraction of Users
Observed
Fig. 6. Variation of the Competitive Ratio with the Fraction of Total Tasks
Completed by an Average User
randomly and each bid was generated uniformly randomly
between 5 and 50. The number of tasks m = 30 with values
uniformly random between 0 and 40. Fig. 5 indicates that
observing 32% (around one-third) of the total number of users
and using their profiles to form a reference set maximizes the
competitive ratio of ONLINE-SMART.
Competitive ratio of ONLINE-SMART depends on the
fraction of total tasks that each user completes on average.
Larger the fraction, larger is the overlap in the tasks completed
by different users. Consequently, users arriving in observation
phase have a lot of common tasks with the users arriving in
selection phase, thereby allowing ONLINE-SMART to make
”good” user selections. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that
the competitive ratio would increase as the average number
of tasks that each user completes increases. This notion is
confirmed through simulation in Fig. 6, where the competitive
ratio was plotted as a function of the total tasks completed
by any user between 10% to 90%. At each step, the best
competitive ratio was plotted using the best value of k for
that particular fraction of total tasks completed by each user.
One interesting question remains: given that we know that
each user completes a certain fraction of tasks on average,
what fraction of users should ONLINE-SMART observe in
order to produce the maximum competitive ratio with respect
to SMART? This is answered in Fig. 7, which is a plot of
the fraction of users observed by ONLINE-SMART while
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Fig. 7. Variation of the Fraction Of Users in the Observation Phase with the
Fraction of Total Tasks Completed by an Average User
producing the competitive ratios depicted in Fig. 6.
We can observe that the fraction of users that need to
be observed by ONLINE-SMART has its maximum when
each user completes 30% of the total tasks on average. This
behavior is quite intuitive since, while choosing a certain
fraction of users to observe, there is a tradeoff between the
quality of the reference set and the number of users left for
selection. If the fraction of users observed is low, the reference
set formed in observation phase will be of low quality and
hence, the selection of winning users based on the reference
set by ONLINE-SMART will be poor. If the fraction of users
observed is high, the reference set formed in the observation
phase will be of high quality, however, there will be very few
users left for selection.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed truthful algorithms for mobile
crowd-sourcing applications for both the offline and online
scenarios. Both the algorithms are inspired by the well-known
VCG mechanism that is known to be truthful, with polynomial
complexity compared to exponential/combinatorial complexity
of the VCG mechanism. The online version of the algorithm
follows the solutions to the k-secretary problem, where first
some users are just observed, and whose profiles are then used
to select users among the remaining ones. Even though we
have been able to show that the proposed algorithm have all
the four useful properties of any auction design, one question
that has not been answered is how much penalty our offline
algorithm pay with respect to the optimal offline algorithm,
and what is the competitive ratio of our online algorithm. Both
of these questions are important in deriving efficient mobile
crowd-sourcing auction design.
REFERENCES
[1] “Nericell,” in http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/nericell/.
[2] “Sensorly,” in www.sensorly.com.
[3] J. Eriksson, L. Girod, B. Hull, R. Newton, S. Madden, and H. Balakr-
ishnan, “The pothole patrol: using a mobile sensor network for road
surface monitoring,” in Proceedings of the 6th international conference
on Mobile systems, applications, and services. 2008, pp. 29–39.
[4] R. K. Rana, C. T. Chou, S. S. Kanhere, N. Bulusu, and W. Hu,
“Ear-phone: an end-to-end participatory urban noise mapping system,”
in Proceedings of the 9th ACM/IEEE International Conference on
Information Processing in Sensor Networks. 2010, pp. 105–116.
[5] T. Yan, M. Marzilli, R. Holmes, D. Ganesan, and M. Corner, “mcrowd:
a platform for mobile crowdsourcing,” in Proceedings of the 7th ACM
Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems. 2009, pp. 347–
348.
[6] X. Sheng, J. Tang, and W. Zhang, “Energy-efficient collaborative sensing
with mobile phones,” in Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, 2012. 2012,
pp. 1916–1924.
[7] L. Duan, T. Kubo, K. Sugiyama, J. Huang, T. Hasegawa, and J. Walrand,
“Incentive mechanisms for smartphone collaboration in data acquisition
and distributed computing,” in Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, 2012.
2012, pp. 1701–1709.
[8] D. Yang, G. Xue, X. Fang, and J. Tang, “Crowdsourcing to smartphones:
incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing,” in Proceedings
of the 18th ACM Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing
and Networking. 2012, pp. 173–184.
[9] W. Vickrey, “Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed ten-
ders,” The Journal of Finance, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 8–37, 1961. [Online].
Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
[10] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm, “Failures of the vcg mechanism in
combinatorial auctions and exchanges,” in Proceedings of the fifth
international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent
systems. 2006, pp. 521–528.
[11] D. Parkes and S. Singh, “An mdp-based approach to online mechanism
design,” in Advances in neural information processing systems, 2003, p.
None.
[12] S. De Vries and R. V. Vohra, “Combinatorial auctions: A survey,”
INFORMS Journal on computing, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 284–309, 2003.
[13] D. Garg, Y. Narahari, and S. Gujar, “Foundations of mechanism de-
sign: A tutorial part 1-key concepts and classical results,” in Sadhana
(Academy Proceedings in Engineering Sciences), vol. 33, no. 2. Indian
Academy of Sciences, 2008, pp. 83–130.
[14] ——, “Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial part 2-advanced
concepts and results,” Sadhana, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 131–174, 2008.
[15] K. Han, C. Zhang, and J. Luo, “Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms for
Powering Mobile Crowdsensing,” ArXiv e-prints, Aug. 2013.
[16] R. Kleinberg, “A multiple-choice secretary algorithm with applications
to online auctions,” in Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. Society for Industrial and Applied
Mathematics, 2005, pp. 630–631.
[17] M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, D. Kempe, and R. Kleinberg, “A knapsack
secretary problem with applications,” Approximation, Randomization,
and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques, pp. 16–28,
2007.
[18] A. Borodin and R. El-Yaniv, Online Computation and Competitive
Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
[19] R. B. Myerson, “Optimal auction design,” Mathematics of operations
research, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 58–73, 1981.
